Holistic Approach for Memory Analysis in Windows System

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ABSTRACT
Research on computer memory analysis has been quite intensive in the past years. A number of tools and techniques have been designed and developed to retrieve critical information from the computer memory. However, most of the tools and techniques have their limitation in the ability to retrieve important information. Hence, in the present study, an alternative approach is proposed to combine the process signature search with page table tracking in order to trace all objects that link with the process block. The result from the experiment shows that the new approach is able to retrieve a large number of objects that link with the process block. A good comparison with the previous studies is conducted as to test the efficiency of the new approach.

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1. INTRODUCTION

With the advent of computer technology, our life has been tremendously affected with both positive and negative impact. The positive aspect of computer technology is in the form of knowledge and information sharing whilst the negative impact is in form of cybercrimes such as online financial frauds, identity theft, impersonating, etc.

The Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Treaty defines the cybercrimes as a range of crime that is committed using the computer, network and hardware devices [21]. Further, Symantec divides the cybercrimes into two main perspectives such as the single event that is facilitated by the crime-ware and the range of activity, starting from cyber stalking to stock market manipulation [10]. In RSA 2012 Cybercrime Trends Report, it is reported that the cybercrime has shown no signs of slowing down. The report also concluded that in every minute, 232 computers have been infected with the malware [3].

Due to the increase in cybercrimes, a field known as Digital Forensic has been established. This field involves with collecting, preserving, analyzing, documenting and presenting the contents of computer as evidence of cybercrime [20]. For over a decade, the investigation in Digital Forensics has been focused on the analysis of the non-volatile devices. Until recently, and with the merge of online storage, the volatile device such as computer memory has become critical in the investigation of Digital Forensic.

The research on the volatile memory started in 2005 where Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) had organized a Windows Memory Challenge. During the event, two analysis tools had been developed which was known as Memparser [18] and KntList [19]. Nevertheless, password, encryption keys and username were only available in volatile memory which has been listed by Jesse, K [13] as sensitive information where it was used to be stored in temporary processes. A study had been done by Garfinkel, Chows and Rosenblum in 2004 that concluded 86% of the data contents still remained in the computer memory. [22]

An explanation on theories of internal structures and address translation has been outlined in Dhamdhere, M [9] and Russinovich and Solomon [8]. Both explain fully on the function of the internal
structure and address translation in the computer memory with Russinovich and Solomon focusing directly towards Windows Operating System. On the other hand, the procedure of storing data by kernel is also demonstrated by Amari, K [7]. In the demonstration, it illustrates that the kernel has set a pool to store the objects. Most of the data in the computer memory are stored in the paged pool. Carrier, B [23] deduce that most of the data is stored in the paged pool as it allows the data to be transferred into hard disk if the computer memory is running low in space. Meanwhile, the important objects such as process and thread blocks are stored in the non-paged pools as the kernel needs to access them frequently. Since the running process still remains intact all the time if the system still on power, therefore they will be available during the acquisition of the physical memory [15].

Apart from that, Virtual Address Description of a process block has a purpose of tracking the status of the process’s address space. This internal structure is maintained by the memory manager and it stores the information on the attributes of the object such as range of the address, inheritance of child and object’s security. Due to the information that is stored in this structure, a tool known as VADTool has been developed with the purpose to track the memory mapped files from the memory dump [4][11]. XORSearch [12] is a tool that is designed based on string search technique. It takes a keyword as an input and then performs the search throughout the memory dump. Further, the tool can also help to find the keyword that has obfuscated by using either Exclusive OR (XOR) or Rotate Left (ROL) function that comes with it.

Windows Operating System represents each process in volatile memory as process block. It contains pointers to both next and previous process blocks. Further, the block stores the information on attributes of the process together with pointer to other data structures that is related to it. Process Environment Block (PEB) which is one of the internal structures of process block is responsible to store the location of executable files and the DLL’s path. Due to this fact, AccessData [16] group has designed a tool that is known as Forensic Toolkit (FTK). This tool will parse the process block to enumerate all the contents within memory. It also applies Directory Table Base (DTB) information in the address translation algorithms in order to identify the process in memory. Further, Windows Memory Forensic Toolkit (WMFT) has applied this technique by tracking the PsActiveProcessHead link to capture all the active processes in the memory dump [17]. Simultaneously, [5] had demonstrated the data extraction from memory dump by using Kernel Processor Control Region (KPCR). In the demonstration, the information such as running processes, current network connection, file content and other data can be extracted from the image.

S. M. Hejazi, C. Talhi, M. Debbabi [6] has outlined the use of application or protocol fingerprint to trace the active application in the memory. The test was conducted to track online application such as email and messenger where from the result, it showed that each of the application had a use fingerprint representation. PTFinder [14] is a tool that applies the file carving where the technique is done linearly to recover only the contiguous file. This technique is applicable because most operating systems will convert the file to be contiguous file instead of fragment files [17].

2. RESEARCH METHOD

The algorithm for the new approach is based on the combination of process signature search and page table tracking. In [1] [2], it is concluded that all the process block in active and inactive mode can be retrieved by using the process signature search technique. Hence, due to this information, this technique will be applied at the beginning of the new approach as the process block is referred to as a critical object and the starting point of the application when it is running in the computer system. Then, once all the process blocks have been retrieved, the algorithm will continue searching for the Page Directory to obtain the Page Table that links with the process block. Finally, the analysis is conducted on the Page Table to capture the address of the important objects that link together with the process block. In summary, the new approach consists of three main algorithms with the purpose of:

a) **Track all Process Blocks in Memory Dump**

Process block represent a critical object in the computer memory. When an application is opened on the computer system, the kernel will allocate this object in the computer memory. This object will remain in the memory until it has been overwritten by other object or data. Thus, there is a chance that the new exile process block may still exist in the memory. Hence, the mechanism to track the available process blocks has to follow the rules that are discussed below:

**RULE 1:** Searching for proã with constant hexadecimal value of 50726fe3 (H)

Proã represents the process signature for all process blocks except idle process. It is located outside the process block at a constant offset (in hexadecimal) of 0x01c (for Windows 2000 and XP), 0x0c0 (Windows 2003) and 0x024(Windows Vista). Figure 1 show the location of proã for metasploit.exe in which the application has ended.
RULE 2: Searching for true process block
Since proa is located outside the process block, there is a chance that it remains in the computer memory whilst the exile process has been overwritten by other object. Thus, to distinguish the overwritten exile process block with the available one, the value that is stored in ImageFileName is required. ImageFileName is an internal structure in process block that stores the name of the process. In theory, the name for process in the computer system will be in .exe extension. Hence, only the value with .exe extension is chosen as a true entity. Once the true entity has been obtained, it is stored in the database for further investigation.

b) Obtain the Page Table from Page Directory
The next stage of the algorithm is to obtain the Page Table of a process block. For all system architecture, the pointers of the Page Table are stored in Page Directory. Hence, the second algorithm is applied to track the Page Directory of process block (for 32 bit system)

RULE 3: Obtain the DirectoryBaseTable (DBT)
DBT is an important internal structure within the process block. It is referred as CR3 register that plays a critical role in address translation. However, to be precise, in a normal 32 bit system, the value in DTB represents the pointer of the Page Directory. Thus, by obtaining its value it may allow to jump to the starting offset of the page Directory. On the other hand, the 32 bit with Page Address Extension (PAE) and 64 bit systems will require an extra step to obtain the starting point of the Page Directory. It is due to the fact that the value within DBT represents the pointer to the offset of selector for Page Directory. In 32 bit system with PAE, there are four entries for selector in which each of them will store a pointer to individual Page Directory. As in 64 bit system, it is possible to have 512 Page Directories for one process block.

RULE 4: Go to Page Directory and read the pointer to Page Table
Once the Page Directory has been retrieved, the value within it which represents the pointer of Page Table is read. For all system architecture, this pointer is stored in 8 bytes wide format. There are three cases for the value that is stored with the entry of Page Directory (in hexadecimal):

Case 1: all the value is equal to zero (e.g. x00000000)
- This defines that the entry is empty. Thus, the algorithm will move to the next entry.

Case 2: the last number is an even number (e.g. x06785082)
- This defines that the Page Table is no longer in the computer memory. Thus, when this value is found, the algorithm will skip to the next entry.

Case 3: the last number is an odd number (e.g. x07860067)
- This defines that the Page Table exists in computer memory. Hence, the algorithm will store this pointer in the database before moving to the next entry.

The process of reading the pointer of Page Table will stop after the last entry of the Page Directory has been read.

RULE 5: Skip the same pointer of the Page Table
In theory, the process blocks in computer memory will share the same Page Table to store the physical address of linked objects. Therefore, a comparison test is conducted to eliminate the same pointer being stored in database twice.

c) Obtain the address of important objects from Page Table
After retrieving all the data from the Page Directory, the third algorithm is applied to obtain the beginning of the offset for the object in the computer system.

RULE 6: Go to Page Table and read the offset of the object.
All the entries within the Page Table are read to obtain the offset of the object. The mechanism of address storing in Page Table is similar as in RULE 4. It will follow the same case as discussed in RULE 4 where the entry in Page Table could be represented as empty entry, remain and exile object offset. Thus, the same method in RULE 4 is applied to capture the remaining object from the computer memory.
3. EXPERIMENT

In the test, the author uses the holistic approach that is discussed previously to retrieve the amount of object that remains in the computer memory. This test is conducted on a memory dump of 32 bit system that is available on Digital Forensic Research Conference (DFRWS) website [18].

A comparison test between the holistic approach and the previous techniques is conducted. This new approach is tested together with the Process Signature Search (PSS), Process Enumeration technique (PET) and the Hybrid approach to identify the advantages and disadvantages for each of the techniques.

PSS is a technique that uses the object’s signature value to capture the processes from the computer memory. However, before the benchmarking test, several experiments have been conducted and the result shows that this technique is also applicable to retrieve other information from the memory image. As an example, the important object that is known as thread can be retrieved by using value of Thrá (Signature for thread). On the other hand, PET is a traditional approach in tracking the object from the memory image where it makes use of Doubly Link between the objects to trace them. The PET is dependent on the address translation algorithm where this algorithm is heavily used for tracing. Finally, the hybrid approach is a combination of both PSS and PET where it has the advantage of tracking the available hidden and exile object from the memory.

4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

From the first experiment, the holistic approach is able to trace about 17074 objects that are still in the DFRWS memory dump. In the beginning of the algorithm, 49 blocks have been detected as process block representation. However, only 46 blocks represent a true entity. This is due to the reason that there is duplicate version of the existing process block in DFRWS memory. In this experiment there are three duplicated process blocks as they occur twice in the DFRWS memory. These processes are known as winlogon.exe, dfrw2005.exe and HKserv.exe. Eventually, there are two set of data for the process with a duplicated block. However, the value that is stored in the DirectoryBaseTable (DBT) will remain the same. This result therefore shows that even if the process has two different offset for its two blocks, it has the same Page Directory for both blocks. Due to this information, the objects which are linked with the process block can be traced by capturing their pointers that are stored in the Page Table (pointer of Page Table are stored in Page Directory).

Each of the process blocks has one Page Directory. Hence, there are 46 Page Directories that have been retrieved from DFRWS memory dump. From these Page Directories, about 291 Page Tables have been identified. However, only 12 entities from these pages represent a shared Page Tables as captured from every process block in the DFRWS memory dump. Generally, the shared Page Tables store a huge number of pointers to link object compared to a normal page table. Table 1 shows some of the Page Tables that exist in the DFRWS memory dump.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset of Page Table</th>
<th>Link Process Block</th>
<th>No of active Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x1031000</td>
<td>All process block</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x1032000</td>
<td>All process block</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x103b000</td>
<td>All process block</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x103c000</td>
<td>All process block</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x636000</td>
<td>WinMgmt.exe</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x83e000</td>
<td>Cmd2k.exe</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x3ef4000</td>
<td>nc.exe</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x5e3f000</td>
<td>Asynmgr.exe</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, some of the Page Tables in DFRWS memory dump will remain empty. There are two possibilities when the Page Table remains empty:

- Possibility 1
  The Page Table acts as reserve to store pointer for new linked objects
- Possibility 2
  The empty Page table is for exile process. Since the process has already ended, the kernel removes the pointer within the Page Table as the object is no longer in the computer memory.

Once all the Page Tables have been traced, the location of the object can be captured. Since there is no use of address translation in the holistic approach, the pointer that is stored within the Page Table will not point directly to the object. This pointer will point to the beginning of the page where the object is resided. Hence, there are two methods to obtain the object from this page:
- Do a cross correlation with the result from Process Enumeration technique to allocate the true location of the object.

- Scan the page of the object and capture all the recognizable structure.

In 32 bit system, the size of a page is equal to 4kb which is equivalence to \( x1000 \) in hexadecimal. Thus, when using the second method, the page of the object (normally starts at \( x000 \)) is scanned from the beginning of the offset until it reaches \( x1000 \) (e.g. from \( x632000 \) to \( x633000 \)).

On the second test, the holistic approach is compared with the existing technique. These existing techniques include the Process Signature Search (PSS), Process Enumeration (PE) and Hybrid Approach (combination of PSS and PE). The result from the comparison test is summarized in table 2 while figure 3 shows the number of objects that can be retrieved from all the techniques.

Table 2. Comparison test’s result

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor/Technique</th>
<th>Process Signature Search</th>
<th>Process Enumeration</th>
<th>Hybrid Approach</th>
<th>Holistic Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Required knowledge</td>
<td>Operating System</td>
<td>Operating System</td>
<td>Operating System</td>
<td>Operating System and System Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address Translation</td>
<td>Not apply</td>
<td>Apply</td>
<td>Apply</td>
<td>Not apply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trace other object than processes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trace hidden and exile processes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trace hidden object besides processes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of object retrieved</td>
<td>553*</td>
<td>4101</td>
<td>4695</td>
<td>17075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of exile processes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hidden object</td>
<td>58**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>12974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*include together with the other objects (e.g threads) that has been retrieved with object’s signature

**the linked object with the process block that is still available from the memory image (e.g thread)

Figure 2. Number of retrievable objects from DFRWS memory dump

Both Process Enumeration and Hybrid Approach require Operating System and System Architecture knowledge since these techniques will use address translation algorithm. In holistic approach, it does not make use of address translation algorithm. This technique only requires knowledge about Page Directory and Page Table which are covered by system architecture. On the other hand, Process Signature Search does not require system architecture knowledge as it only uses the process signature (proa) to trace all the process blocks in the computer memory. This make it useful due to its ability to trace both hidden and exile process from computer memory as it is involved in both hybrid and holistic approaches.

The Process Enumeration technique has a disadvantage as it cannot detect any hidden and exile object from the computer memory. This scenario happens because the technique cannot trace any object that is no longer in a Doubly Link between active objects. On the other hand, the holistic approach has an advantage against the hybrid since it searches all the entries in the page table. This event does not happen...
with the hybrid approach as the process of tracking the object relies directly to the address translation algorithm. Therefore, the hybrid approach is unable to detect some of the entries in Page Table.

5. CONCLUSION
From the result of the experiment, it shows that the holistic approach is able to retrieve more objects from the computer memory compared to the existing techniques. Combining this technique with the Process Enumeration or Address Translation algorithm may result in the data from the object be retrieved directly. For future work, a combination of the holistic approach and the analysis on virtual memory from the hard drive can be experimented to improve on the chance of retrieving other important object.

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